Between August 1990 and 1991 Kuwait was invaded by Iraq and eventually liberated by the United States primarily (alongside a handful of Allied forces).
We where all glued to the television sets watching CNN which had back-to-back, 24 hour coverage of Iraq and Kuwait. The Invasion was played out in real time in every little detail. We would see a scud being launched from Southern Iraq, only to be notified that it was heading towards Dammam. Fifteen minutes later the local civil authorities would turn on the sirens signaling a Scud attack. CNN was intense, detailed, live and captivating.
All other news on CNN was neglected. Ads where put on hold. Kuwait was important. Iraq had to be stopped. The oil had to flow.
Nineteen years later, the possible seeds of a new Iranian revolution are beginning to bloom. This will have a global effect based on the outcome. It will affect the freedom of people, it will affect the price and supply of oil. It will change the whole political map of the Middle East.
Turning the channel to CNN to see what is the latest on this important event, what do I see - what are the latest news? The Jonas Brothers will apear on Larry King? The Lakers? Coby did something? Okay, what is on the ticker tape at the bottom of the screen? Nothing, no mention of Iran, just sports results. Iran ceased to exist.
Where can someone concerned about Iran and interested in what is happening there go to? Twitter. Yes, Twitter. The place where angst driven teens tell you what they are eating, celebrities write through their PR agents about their next events and many others. Twitter has become the new real time news channel for Iran. You can follow the latest events by searching here. Videos are posted, pictures taken, posted as soon as they are taken.
Here is an interesting analysis of the recent Iran developments from 'Stratfor':
'Western Misconceptions Meet Iranian Reality'
By George Friedman
'Stratfor'
In 1979, when we were still young and starry-eyed, a revolution took place in Iran. When I asked experts what would happen, they divided into two camps.
The first group of Iran experts argued that the Shah of Iran would certainly survive, that the unrest was simply a cyclical event readily manageable by his security, and that the Iranian people were united behind the Iranian monarch's modernization program. These experts developed this view by talking to the same Iranian officials and businessmen they had been talking to for years -- Iranians who had grown wealthy and powerful under the shah and who spoke English, since Iran experts frequently didn't speak Farsi all that well.
The second group of Iran experts regarded the shah as a repressive brute, and saw the revolution as aimed at liberalizing the country. Their sources were the professionals and academics who supported the uprising -- Iranians who knew what former Supreme Leader Ayatollah Ruholla Khomeini believed, but didn't think he had much popular support. They thought the revolution would result in an increase in human rights and liberty. The experts in this group spoke even less Farsi than the those in the first group.
Misreading Sentiment in Iran
Limited to information on Iran from English-speaking opponents of the regime, both groups of Iran experts got a very misleading vision of where the revolution was heading -- because the Iranian revolution was not brought about by the people who spoke English. It was made by merchants in city bazaars, by rural peasants, by the clergy -- people Americans didn't speak to because they couldn't. This demographic was unsure of the virtues of modernization and not at all clear on the virtues of liberalism. From the time they were born, its members knew the virtue of Islam, and that the Iranian state must be an Islamic state.
Americans and Europeans have been misreading Iran for 30 years. Even after the shah fell, the myth has survived that a mass movement of people exists demanding liberalization -- a movement that if encouraged by the West eventually would form a majority and rule the country. We call this outlook "iPod liberalism," the idea that anyone who listens to rock 'n' roll on an iPod, writes blogs and knows what it means to Twitter must be an enthusiastic supporter of Western liberalism. Even more significantly, this outlook fails to recognize that iPod owners represent a small minority in Iran -- a country that is poor, pious and content on the whole with the revolution forged 30 years ago.
There are undoubtedly people who want to liberalize the Iranian regime. They are to be found among the professional classes in Tehran, as well as among students. Many speak English, making them accessible to the touring journalists, diplomats and intelligence people who pass through. They are the ones who can speak to Westerners, and they are the ones willing to speak to Westerners. And these people give Westerners a wildly distorted view of Iran. They can create the impression that a fantastic liberalization is at hand -- but not when you realize that iPod-owning Anglophones are not exactly the majority in Iran.
Last Friday, Iranian President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad was re-elected with about two-thirds of the vote. Supporters of his opponent, both inside and outside Iran, were stunned. A poll revealed that former Iranian Prime Minister Mir Hossein Mousavi was beating Ahmadinejad. It is, of course, interesting to meditate on how you could conduct a poll in a country where phones are not universal, and making a call once you have found a phone can be a trial. A poll therefore would probably reach people who had phones and lived in Tehran and other urban areas. Among those, Mousavi probably did win. But outside Tehran, and beyond persons easy to poll, the numbers turned out quite different.
